

## Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism in the Policy Arena

Kent Eaton

John M. Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart, eds., *Executive Decree Authority*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Peter F. Cowhey and Matthew D. McCubbins, eds., *Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1995.

Bert A. Rockman and R. Kent Weaver, eds., *Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad*, Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution Press, 1993.

Academic debate between advocates of parliamentary and presidential democracy initially focused on which institutional arrangement better contained political conflict and provided democratic stability. This early focus reflected the conditions in the 1980s, when many countries were emerging from periods of nondemocratic rule and choosing between the two options. Critics of presidentialism warned that the separation of powers carried significant risks for these new democracies, while other scholars disputed the link between presidentialism and the breakdown of democracy.<sup>1</sup> Policy figured in this debate only insofar as critics of presidentialism argued that the separation of powers increased the likelihood of policy stalemate and thus regime instability.

Increasingly, however, the terms of the debate over parliamentarism and presidentialism have broadened to include a more explicit concern for policy. Does the process of policy making and implementation in parliamentary regimes differ in important and systematic ways from the policy process in presidential systems? The three books under review are to date the most comprehensive and sophisticated treatments connecting the debate over parliamentary and presidential government with actual policy outcomes. Each is a collection of case studies that combines the detailed analysis of specific policies in selected countries with attempts to generalize about the role of institutions in policy selection. None of these books is exclusively concerned with the question of parliamentary versus presidential government, yet important insights can be gleaned from each about the systematic impact of governmental types on the policy process.

### ANNOUNCEMENT

#### *Comparative Politics*

along with the Graduate School of the City of New York,  
has moved to

365 Fifth Avenue  
New York, NY 10016-4309

Telephone: 212-817-8686  
Email: [comppol@gc.cuny.edu](mailto:comppol@gc.cuny.edu)

We have unfortunately experienced brief interruptions in the communications systems of our new building. Please accept our apologies for any difficulties readers and authors may have had in communicating with our editorial office. The editorial work of our office has not been affected by these interruptions. All manuscripts are being reviewed and decided on by our Editorial Committee without delays, and publication of *Comparative Politics* has not been affected.

Shifting the focus of the debate to policy outcomes is obviously a welcome departure for those whose interest in politics results from their primary interest in policy. But it is important to other audiences as well for a variety of reasons. Due to a growing appreciation of the independent role of political institutions, fewer political scientists now perceive democratic stability as mainly a function of economic policy and performance than twenty years ago. Nevertheless, many scholars worry about the long-term resilience of democracies in which politicians prove unable to find policy solutions for entrenched problems such as poverty and unemployment.<sup>2</sup> Others have argued that certain styles of policymaking threaten the very consolidation of democratic government.<sup>3</sup> The new policy focus on governmental type thus provides an important connection to the sizable body of scholarship on democratic transition and consolidation. The debate over parliamentarism and presidentialism has always had an important normative dimension; the academic arguments of each side have occasionally found their way into debates in different countries over the merits of each governmental type.<sup>4</sup> If one governmental type can be shown to have certain policymaking attributes, this conclusion would further heighten the significance of the academic debate for the nonacademic world. For committed institutionalists the emphasis on policy also makes it possible for the debate over governmental type to contribute to theoretical discussions of the consequences of institutional variation for policy process and substance.<sup>5</sup> At the same time, some of the new research on policymaking in parliamentary and presidential systems offers grist for the mills of those who advocate approaches to policy selection that are based on interests rather than institutions. For example, while many of the contributors to the three books under review emphasize the importance of governmental type as an institutional choice, some find in their policy case studies that this choice matters little relative to other factors such as the organization and strength of various interest groups. The literature on governmental type now ties in to central debates within comparative and international political economy between those who ascribe causal importance to the political institutions that supply policy and those who emphasize the interests that demand policy.

Perhaps ironically, the new focus on policy outcomes also offers additional evidence to help adjudicate the debate over whether the parliamentarism-presidentialism distinction is by itself very useful. As the scholar whose critique of presidentialism set off the debate in the 1980s, Linz maintains that "all presidential and parliamentary systems have a common core that allows their differentiation and some systematic comparisons."<sup>6</sup> According to Linz, despite institutional variation within the categories of parliamentary and presidential government, the fusion or separation of powers generates some consistent differences in terms of the incentives and constraints that face policymakers. For example, despite the importance of the number and stability of parties in the cabinet, its ultimate dependence on parliament remains a critical point that distinguishes cabinets from all independently elected chief executives.

utives. In their analysis of the institutional foundations of democratic government, Moe and Caldwell likewise emphasize the transcendental nature of the choice between parliamentary and presidential government. "When nations choose a presidential or parliamentary form, they are choosing a whole system, whose various properties arise endogenously...out of the political dynamics that their adopted form sets in motion."<sup>7</sup>

In contrast, scholars who emphasize institutional variation within each governmental type downplay the significance of the distinction between parliamentarism and presidentialism. Instead, these scholars suggest that the debate between parliamentary and presidential government is pitched at too high a level to be able to yield meaningful insights about political outcomes and the policy process. For them, because of variation within each governmental type, generalizations about differences between parliamentary and presidential governments are either impossible or must be highly qualified. For example, Shugart and Carey responded to Linz's critique of presidentialism by highlighting diversity in the performance of different presidential systems and by attributing this diversity to a series of lower-level institutional choices, including the president's formal legislative powers and the electoral calendar.<sup>8</sup> Jones likewise focused on variation within presidentialism and the electoral stability of some presidential systems to electoral laws that produce majorities for the presidents party in the legislature.<sup>9</sup> Mainwaring also emphasized the number of parties; he argued that the interbranch conflicts said to characterize presidentialism as a type are particularly acute in multiparty systems and less pronounced in systems with fewer parties.<sup>10</sup> Tsebelis notes that policymaking in parliamentary systems governed by multiparty coalitions shares features with presidential systems, including a greater number of veto points and greater obstacles to policy change.<sup>11</sup> In addition to party system variation, democracies may vary in such other institutional dimensions as electoral rules, bicameralism, federalism, and judicial review. Due to these confounding variables, Tsebelis has questioned the utility of "institutional debates conducted in pairs" such as those that contrast parliamentary and presidential regimes without simultaneously accounting for variation in these other institutional dimensions.<sup>12</sup>

Is the distinction between parliamentary and presidential government of fundamental importance, or is it merely one of many institutional features that merit equal attention by political analysts? Despite salient differences that I highlight below, most of the research presented in *Do Institutions Matter?* and *Structure and Policy* supports the importance of the distinction between parliamentarism and presidentialism. Neither of these books, however, focuses exclusively on governmental type. Given their attempts to explain specific, complex policy outcomes, it is little wonder that the contributors incorporate other explanatory variables in addition to governmental type. The contributors to *Structure and Policy* are the most parsimonious in this regard, due to their common commitment to rationalist institutionalism. They

argue that two sets of institutions, governmental type and electoral rules, account for variation in American and Japanese policies in a number of distinct areas, including the budget, telecommunications, nuclear power, the exchange rate, and foreign policy. Pursuing a much more inductive research method, the contributors to *Do Institutions Matter?* are more eclectic in their approach and consider a variety of what they take to be separate explanatory variables, including bureaucratic autonomy, electoral constraints, social conditions, and past policy choices. While the contributors to *Structure and Policy* consider many of these same extra variables in their case studies, they argue that the response of politicians to bureaucrats, social structures, and policy inheritances is determined largely by the nature of the political institutions surrounding them, that is, governmental type and electoral rules.

Having considered additional explanatory variables in one way or another, most of the case studies in these books report regular and significant differences between parliamentary and presidential systems.<sup>13</sup> I hope to show, however, that problems of case selection in many instances lead authors to overstate claims about the differences between parliamentarism and presidentialism. On the one hand, the focus on Japan and the U.S. as examples of parliamentary and presidential government, together with the use of a common rationalist approach, makes *Structure and Policy* a powerfully coherent and tightly argued book. On the other hand, it is often difficult to determine whether the policy outcomes identified result from presidential and parliamentary government or from the American and Japanese versions of them, two party presidentialism in the U.S. and a single-party-dominant system in Japan. *Do Institutions Matter?* partially remedies this problem by theorizing about and presenting research on different varieties of parliamentarism, including party government, multiparty coalitions, and single-party-dominant systems. Though it includes ten case studies that cover nine countries in various combinations, it unfortunately limits its analysis of presidentialism to the U.S. This restriction poses a problem because many of the attributes that are said to characterize U.S. presidentialism, such as powerful legislative committees, may be absent in other presidential systems. *Executive Decree Authority* fills the gap in research on presidentialism with studies of policymaking in five non-U.S. presidential systems: Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Russia, and Venezuela.<sup>14</sup>

This review essay addresses six different attributes of the policy process. I synthesize and evaluate relevant policy evidence from each of the three books about how parliamentary and presidential governments differ for each attribute. These attributes include the number of veto players, the site of policy negotiations, the provision of collective goods, accountability, interest group strategies, and delegation to bureaucrats. I argue that many, but not all, of the apparent regular differences between parliamentarism and presidentialism break down when the diversity of each governmental type is taken into account.

### The Number of Veto Players

The number of veto players is at the heart of the distinction between systems that fuse legislative powers in the parliament and systems that divide powers between the legislature and the chief executive. According to Tsebelis, "a veto player is an individual or collective actor whose agreement is required for a policy decision."<sup>15</sup> In presidential systems separately elected veto players hold fixed terms and enjoy separate sources of democratic legitimacy. Multiple veto points make it difficult to pass legislation; successful bills are often the product of policy bargains and logrolls that are virtually impossible to reverse once legislated.<sup>16</sup> When the executive and legislative branches are controlled by different parties, either may veto policy changes initiated in the other branch, and irreconcilable policy disagreements between the branches can not be institutionally resolved by any means short of impeachment.<sup>17</sup> In many presidential systems policy differences between the branches appear to drive impeachment proceedings, and these proceedings tend to prove more destabilizing than the vote of no confidence procedure used to resolve important policy disputes in parliamentary systems.<sup>18</sup> When the two branches are controlled by the same party, Tsebelis argues, they should not be counted as separate veto players. However, this counting decision probably understates the amount of policy conflict that occurs under unified government in presidential systems since presidents and legislators are still elected by different rules and in districts of different sizes, which should be understood as institutional sources of policy disagreement even when the same party controls both branches. In parliamentary systems the cabinet originates in and is responsible to the majority in the assembly and thus can not veto the policy preferences of the majority and remain a cabinet for long. In the potential absence of such veto points, some scholars identify a commitment problem in those parliamentary systems where majority parties enjoy such a concentration of power that they can more easily renege on policy deals than in most presidential systems.<sup>19</sup> Policy studies in the books under review that compare the U.S. with single party parliamentary systems support the connection between presidentialism and greater veto points. Including other presidential and parliamentary systems in the analysis, however, throws the connection into question.

Support for the importance of veto players in presidentialism is most abundant in the detailed case studies that compare Japan and the U.S. in a number of policy arenas, including nuclear power, telecommunications, and the environment. In *Structure and Policy*, Cohen, McCubbins, and Rosenbluth argue that the separation of powers helps explain why the U.S. has lagged behind parliamentary systems like Japan in the development of nuclear power. According to these authors, the passage by the U.S. Congress of two pieces of legislation—the National Environmental Policy Act and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act—gave the states "powerful tools to check plans for the development of nuclear power generation capacity, even to the extent of dupli-

cating and perhaps challenging Nuclear Regulatory Commission reviews."<sup>20</sup> By empowering states and localities, legislators strategically ensured that the local constituents who are important to them are allowed to participate in regulation by the independently elected executive branch. This procedure has resulted in a multiplicity of licenses required to site, build, test, and operate nuclear power plants in the U.S., many of which are processed at different levels of government in a lengthy process made even more uncertain by intervening elections. In a parliamentary system like Japan, in contrast, the legislature retains ultimate authority over the bureaucrats who process licenses, and legislators have structured a more streamlined process. If important constituents are harmed by nuclear power regulation, the majority Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in the legislature can easily bring responsible bureaucrats to task, unlike in presidential systems. This streamlined process lowers regulatory costs and the risks of investment in nuclear power. Thus, Japan has been able to develop nuclear power to a much greater degree than the U.S. because a single veto player, the LDP, has not had to share authority with any other separately elected actor.

Noll and Rosenbluth come to many of the same conclusions regarding veto points and policy stability in their analysis of telecommunications liberalization. Both Japan and the U.S. substantially liberalized their telecommunications markets in the 1980s and 1990s in response to user and supplier groups who were opposed to regulated monopolies.<sup>21</sup> While the authors trace differences in the content of liberalization policy to the different electoral incentives facing Japanese and American legislators, they attribute the speed of policy change to the number of veto players. In the U.S. serious efforts to challenge AT&T's vertical integration began in the 1930s and resulted in its separation into eight companies only in 1981. This lengthy delay resulted from the conflicting interests of four different veto players: Congress, the departments of defense and justice, and the courts. In contrast, the LDP in Japan began discussions on the privatization of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT) in 1982 and voted to submit the telecommunications bill to the diet in April 1984. Legislating privatization depended on the decision of just a single actor and, "because agreements are negotiated behind the scenes, with cash used for side payments, a legislative deal need not reveal all of its terms, and so is easier to reach."<sup>22</sup>

While the contributors to *Structure and Policy* agree that the U.S. presidential system has more veto points than Japanese parliamentary government, the multiple veto points at play in presidential systems do not always conspire against policy change. In their analysis of international macroeconomic coordination leading to the 1985 Plaza Accord, Fukui and Weatherford argue that the U.S. executive was able to force Japan to take action to drive up the value of its currency because of the credible threat that, in the absence of such a change in exchange rate policy, the U.S. Congress would use its prerogatives on trade policy to penalize Japan.<sup>23</sup> At the domestic level, then, the separation of powers may create obstacles for policy change that become opportunities in a two-level game.

Based on the comparisons of the U.S. and Japan, presidentialism appears to create more veto players than parliamentarism. Widening the focus to include other types of parliamentary and presidential systems, however, suggests that the simple distinction between parliamentarism and presidentialism does not determine the number of veto players. Two examples are multiparty parliamentarism, discussed by some of the contributors to *Do Institutions Matter?*, and presidential systems where the president is endowed with constitutional decree authority, discussed by Carey and Shugart.

Among parliamentary systems, the logic of veto point analysis suggests that multiparty coalitions will yield a higher number of veto players than single-party-dominant systems, potentially approximating the veto points that characterize presidentialism. In *Do Institutions Matter?*, Schick analyzes efforts by the U.S., the Netherlands, and Sweden to reduce budget deficits in the 1980s and finds similar outcomes in the U.S. presidential system and Dutch multiparty parliamentarism.<sup>24</sup> In the U.S. the conflicting fiscal priorities of congressional Democrats and a Republican president led not only to historic deficits, but to dissembling about political responsibility for the deficit. In the Netherlands' parliamentary system early success in deficit reduction by a coalition government of Christian Democrats and Liberals was reversed prior to the 1989 elections, when the two cabinet parties developed different policy preferences. The Christian Democrats wanted to increase spending, while the Liberals remained committed to austerity; each had the means to veto attempts by the other party to enact its preferred policy. Schick contrasts these two cases of paralysis with party government in Sweden. The Swedish Social Democratic Party enjoyed a majority in the legislature from 1982 to 1991. This majority enabled it to concentrate sufficient power in the cabinet to eliminate the deficit by increasing revenue five percentage points relative to GDP. As further support for the critical distinction between party government and multiparty coalitions, Schick argues that during Sweden's earlier experience with multiparty parliamentarism between 1980 and 1982 a coalition of bourgeois parties was unable to pursue a determined course in fiscal policy.<sup>25</sup>

In presidential systems, *Executive Decree Authority* uncovers a great deal of variation in the degree to which different presidents are endowed with constitutional decree authority. Though one of the major purposes and main contributions of this book is to question the assumption that decree authority necessarily undermines congressional prerogatives, in practice constitutional decree authority often reduces the veto power of players in the legislature. For example, Carey and Shugart correctly point out that constitutional decree authority alone does not allow the president to set policy unilaterally or circumvent the veto points characteristic of presidentialism. "In the presence of cohesive assembly majorities, decree authority...will not allow executives to make their policy preferences stick unless decree is combined with reactive powers," such as the ability to veto rival laws passed by the legislature.<sup>26</sup> Many legis-

latures in presidential systems, however, rarely enjoy cohesive majorities and, for these bodies, constitutional decree authority (as distinct from delegated decree authority) threatens their ability to participate meaningfully in the policy process.

Furthermore, even if the president does not have a veto, legislators may still face practical problems in reversing or modifying decrees. This case is best seen in Powers' study of Brazil, where presidents can use provisional measures to decree laws into effect for a period of thirty days. Such decrees become law only when approved by the legislature, but the executive can reissue decrees indefinitely. Recent presidents such as Fernando Collor de Mello have depended on the reiteration of decrees to implement their most important initiatives. Consequently, "public policies are debated after rather than before their enactment into law."<sup>27</sup> Though the congress is technically free to alter the decrees, in practice it is constrained by what Powers calls "clean-up costs" since the 1988 constitution requires congress to correct through additional legislation all of the possible ramifications of rejecting a decree. In order to reject the antiinflationary decree through which President Collor froze bank accounts, for instance, congress would have had to anticipate and take action on a variety of possible consequences of rejecting the decree, including capital flight, inflation, and the collapse of the banking system. The practical dilemmas posed by rejecting presidential decrees were also salient in Argentina. Ferreira and Goretti argue that the Argentine supreme court approved a presidential decree that created a forced public loan system since finding the decree unconstitutional would have had serious implications for the solvency of the state.<sup>28</sup> In practice, decrees can undermine the effectiveness of congressional veto players, and consequently lower the barriers to policy change in presidential systems, even when these players retain formal legislative powers.

Whether powers are fused or separated is an important consideration in counting veto players, but it is not determinative. Instead, counting the number of veto players at work in a given policy area is often a messy and subjective affair, despite Tsebelis' argument that veto player analysis offers a "conceptually consistent method of making comparisons across systems."<sup>29</sup> Difficulty in defining what should count as a veto player challenges the deceptively straightforward appeal of the veto player concept. For example, though the contributors to *Structure and Policy* contrast the single veto player in Japanese parliamentarism with the multiple players in U.S. presidentialism, they present compelling evidence that significant veto players operate within the LDP. Cowhey argues that unwanted initiatives by LDP cabinet ministers on military policy were checked by the LDP's own Policy Affairs Research Committees (PARC).<sup>30</sup> Noll and Rosenbluth show that, despite the swift legislation of NTT's privatization, the company's long-standing ties to members of the PARC telecommunications division "succeeded in preventing real privatization of NTT for several years."<sup>31</sup> In *Do Institutions Matter?*, Feigenbaum, Samuels, and Weaver conclude that Japan outperformed the U.S. in developing nuclear power but argue that the

LDP also had to confront and overcome the opposition of affected local communities by buying them off.<sup>32</sup> These cases reveal the ambiguity involved in counting veto players. In light of Japanese policy stasis in the 1990s in the face of growing economic crisis, which many attribute to internal LDP dynamics, who is to say that the veto players operating within the LDP count for less than veto players in presidential systems? Despite the benefits of veto player analysis, including spatial modeling and applications of the winset concept, detailed research is necessary to identify veto players and to specify the nature of their veto power. As successful policy analysts have always known, the first step in policy analysis is identification of all the relevant actors who have stakes in and the power to affect the outcome of a policy process.

### The Site of Policy Negotiation

One of the many contributions of these three books is the suggestion that parliamentarism and presidentialism may differ systematically, not so much in the amount of bargaining among politicians over policy, but rather in the sites where such bargains are negotiated. Sites affect the visibility of bargains to voters, and visibility may decrease or increase the likelihood of agreement among politicians over different types of policy. Many of the policy case studies under review indicate that it can be harder to locate who has influence and where they exert it in systems with fused powers. In these systems, policy analysts tend to emphasize the importance of party caucuses, subcommittee level meetings, and informal, private give-and-take between party leaders and backbenchers as sites of policy bargains. Public and often publicized conflict over legislation is more common in presidential systems, where a bill must work its way through the separately elected chambers to a separately elected president. The separation of powers creates the potential for greater policymaking transparency, an important finding that stands up across many countries. Two cautionary points are in order, however. First, private, behind-the-scenes exchanges are important in presidential systems, too. Second, the heavy use of executive decrees in some presidential systems undercuts presidentialism's claim to transparency.

Due to its tendency to publicize conflict, the separation of powers may have played a role in tarnishing presidentialism's reputation as an institutional arrangement that can be effective at policymaking. Failures by politicians in presidential systems to overcome veto points and legislate policy are likely to become public knowledge. For example, Pierson and Weaver report that only two out of seven pension cutting initiatives in the U.S. presidential system since 1977 actually resulted in major changes, a higher failure rate than in the parliamentary systems they study. They note, however, that, "in parliamentary systems, proposals that lack adequate support within the governing party usually will not see the light of day."<sup>33</sup>

Since information about policy and politicians is often costly to acquire, the separation of powers may produce valuable information for voters. In *Structure and Policy*, Cowhey argues that the tug-of-war between the branches in the U.S. presidential system "leads to more systematic disclosure of information about policymaking. This increases the transparency of foreign policy choices both to voters at home and foreign allies."<sup>34</sup> He concludes that U.S. foreign policy commitments have been highly credible because they concealed no hidden agreements that could easily unravel if exposed. In Japan, in contrast, the LDP had to rely on "prominent pledges" and other self-binding behavior to make credible its commitment to limited amounts of defense spending because it enjoyed such a concentration of power that it alone could decide to deviate from the country's avowed foreign policy commitments.

Noll and Rosenbluth argue that the same veto points that slowed the pace of liberalization in the U.S. also heightened the transparency of the policy process. This transparency had a positive effect since transparency and the possibility for coordinated corruption between regulators and regulated industries are inversely related. They note, in contrast, the high levels of corruption that characterize telecommunications policy in Japan, where responsibility for policy trade-offs and side payments were concentrated over a long period of time within a single party in parliament.

Different locations for substantive policy bargains are also apparent in budgetary politics. As part of their central argument that LDP politicians rather than bureaucrats control the budgetary process, McCubbins and Noble maintain that legislators in Japan have enormous policy input, but not necessarily in the legislature. They find that internal party bodies (Policy Affairs Research Committees) to which LDP legislators are named rather than parliamentary committees are important. "Spending ministries report to the relevant PARC divisions before they submit their requests to the Ministry of Finance."<sup>35</sup> Backbenchers thus get what they need for electoral success from the budget before it is submitted to the parliament. Party leaders control the process by balancing electoral particularism with broad macroeconomic constraints, but this balancing act is not subject to great public scrutiny. Budgetary politics in the U.S. differ sharply. The budget that the president sends to Congress is occasionally declared dead on arrival and, with few exceptions, is substantially reworked by Congress at many different stages and in a highly visible manner.

Not all bargaining over the budget is visible in presidential systems. For example, in a study of Argentine budgetary politics Jones finds that most important bargains between legislators and the executive branch also occur as the budget is being drafted by the finance ministry, well before it makes it to the floor of the congress.<sup>36</sup> Most likely, the connection between presidentialism and policymaking transparency depends on intervening variables such as the degree to which internal congressional institutions are developed. In presidential systems where politicians face lower reelection rates and higher party discipline than in the U.S., legislators may have

fewer incentives to invest in the development of institutions like congressional committees. These systems centralize policy negotiation in the executive branch despite the formal separation of powers.

The "regular" legislative process in presidentialism implies a tug-of-war between the branches that produces information about politicians, their policy preferences, and connections to pressure groups. There are real concerns about how often these channels are actually used in many presidential democracies. Legislation via executive decree often supplants the use of regular legislative channels. The reliance on decrees suggests that policy bargains are negotiated in the executive branch, not in open give-and-take between the executive and legislative branches. For example, Ferreira and Goretti note the reliance of Argentine president Carlos Menem on the issuance of *decretos de necesidad y urgencia* (need and urgency decrees), many of which were not even communicated to congress. They also find that the legislature took no action on 90 percent of the decrees that Menem submitted.<sup>37</sup> Lack of action does not necessarily imply agency losses for legislators, since the content of many simply anticipated legislators' preferences. While the decrees do not seem to threaten the interests of legislators from Menem's Peronist Party significantly, they reduce the transparency and stability of the policymaking process. In Venezuela, Crisp notes that the legislature commonly delegates decree powers of varying scope to the president when both branches are controlled by the same party.<sup>38</sup> Bargains over policy are subsequently worked out, not on the floor of congress or in public interactions between the branches, but within the governing party. This practice looks not unlike parliamentarism.

### The Provision of Collective Goods

Many politicians appear to be more interested in legislating targeted policies that provide particularistic benefits than policies of national scope that provide collective goods. Figuring out why different political systems strike such different balances in the provision of collective versus particularistic goods is an increasingly salient research agenda. Students of the U.S. presidential system have long noted the pronounced interest of legislators in providing their constituents with divisible goods for which they can claim credit. Linz extends the argument more broadly to congressional parties in presidential systems, which do not have responsibility for national policy and subsequently "turn to the representation of special interests, localized interests, and clientelistic networks in their constituencies."<sup>39</sup>

Many of the contributors to these books tend to support this view of legislatures in presidential systems, but they also make two points that partially counter it. First, particularistic decision making may also characterize cabinet government in parliamentary systems. As Rockman and Weaver argue, the centralization of budgeting

authority in cabinet government "may promote a 'politically efficient' allocation of resources to the districts of cabinet ministers, to localities favoring the governing party or parties, or to tightly contested electoral districts."<sup>40</sup> An overarching theme of *Structure and Policy* is that party leaders in Japan's parliamentary system carefully balance the particularistic demands of individual legislators with the party's overall macroeconomic policy strategy.

Second, though the separation of powers may free legislators in presidential systems from responsibility for national policy, presidentialism guarantees a policymaking role for an actor elected in a nationwide district. In both parliamentary and presidential systems legislators are typically (but not always) elected in subnational districts, but in the latter a chief executive is separately elected in a national district. As Moe and Caldwell argue, unlike legislators, presidents "are held responsible for virtually every aspect of national performance."<sup>41</sup> Presidents are thus institutionally well poised to articulate the need for collective goods such as the national defense. For example, in three studies comparing various aspects of defense policy in Japan and the U.S. Bobrow, Cowhey, and Kolodziej come to similar conclusions about the protagonism of the president vis-à-vis defense policy. All three authors find that U.S. defense policy combines the different policy preferences of presidents and legislators in a relatively stable bargain: the president takes responsibility for shaping national defense policy as a collective good, while legislators infuse this policy with particularism such as defense contracts for local constituents.<sup>42</sup>

### Accountability

The question of accountability has figured prominently in debates over the fusion and separation of powers. Critics of presidentialism argue that, since the executive and legislative branches share policymaking authority, they can shirk sole responsibility for policy failures, making it difficult for voters to know whom they should hold accountable.<sup>43</sup> In parliamentary systems, voters can easily identify the parties with representation in the cabinet as exclusively responsible for policy. In contrast, Shugart and Carey find a high degree of accountability in presidentialism "since voters vote directly for an executive who cannot be removed by shifting coalitions in the assembly."<sup>44</sup> Most of the policy evidence amassed in *Do Institutions Matter?* supports the argument that policymaking in presidential systems suffers from greater accountability problems than in parliamentary systems. Some of the chapter authors, however, argue that voters have an easier time holding individual legislators accountable in presidential systems like the U.S. Furthermore, analysis of a broader set of presidential systems in *Executive Decree Authority* suggests that delegation may in practice solve some of the accountability problems created by the separation of powers.

Shared legislative authority between two separately elected branches often plays

havoc with voters' ability to identify which actors are most responsible for the policy outcomes that matter to them. With respect to the political behavior that led to historic budget deficits in the U.S. in the 1980s, Schick finds that "nobody was to blame because everybody was to blame."<sup>45</sup> Accountability, however, does not just entail punishing politicians for unpopular policies; it also requires that voters are able to reward them for enacting policies they favor. The desire for rewards can lead to perverse policy outcomes under the separation of powers. For example, Schick argues that under divided government in presidential systems a "bidding up" process sometimes occurs in which each branch increases the good supplied by government in an attempt to claim credit for the policy. Examples include the sharp increase in social security benefits in 1972 and the deep tax cut of 1981. Vogel uncovers a similar dynamic at play in the provision of collective goods such as a cleaner environment. Under Nixon's government, at a time when public concern about pollution was very high, each branch wanted to claim credit for tougher environmental regulations.<sup>46</sup> Thus, the identification and accountability problems characteristic of presidential democracy led to higher levels of regulation than politicians with the same policy preferences would likely have endorsed in a system of fused powers.

To the extent that parliamentary systems concentrate policymaking authority in the cabinet, accountability problems may be lessened. Such concentration of power, however, may create problems of its own for policies that involve the imposition of losses, since there can be no fudging about political responsibility for these losses. As Pierson and Weaver argue, "because governmental power is more centralized in parliamentary systems, accountability is more centralized as well."<sup>47</sup> They make this point persuasively in their discussion of efforts by American, Canadian, and British politicians to cut old age pensions. They find that, despite heading a single-party majority government that gave him the necessary power to de-index social security benefits as called for in the Conservative party platform, Canadian prime minister Brian Mulroney backed away from this position because he was concerned about the electoral fallout of imposing pension cuts.<sup>48</sup>

While Pierson and Weaver generally find lower levels of accountability in the U.S. presidential system, they argue that, through mechanisms such as roll call votes and vetoes, individual legislators and the president can be held individually accountable for policy positions.<sup>49</sup> Roll call votes may be an especially effective way of increasing the accountability of legislators elected in single member districts, where voters can demand loyalty to the district over loyalty to the party. Recent decisions in Venezuela (1993) and Bolivia (1996) to incorporate single member districts into the traditional system of party lists were designed in part to increase this type of accountability between legislators and their constituents. In single member districts in parliamentary systems, the ability of voters to hold legislators individually accountable to their districts is undercut by the level of party discipline needed to maintain confidence in the government.<sup>50</sup>



If politicians can be held individually accountable in presidential systems, they can also try to avoid being held accountable by delegating policymaking authority to the president. With the critical difference that the president retains his separate source of democratic legitimacy, delegation in presidential systems mimics parliamentarism by concentrating decision-making power in the executive cabinet. Some country case studies in *Executive Decree Authority* show that legislators often delegate reform powers to the president in the hope that the electorate will hold the president alone accountable for the pain produced by economic reform. For example, Parrish finds that Russian legislators voted to delegate sweeping decree powers to President Yeltsin in November 1991 in order to facilitate the radical economic reform program for which they did not want to be held responsible. These powers enabled Yeltsin to issue decrees related to "banking, the stock market, ... investment, customs activity, the budget, price formation, taxation, property, land reform, and employment."<sup>51</sup> Similarly, Schmidt argues that Peruvian legislators in the opposition APRA party delegated power to the president in 1968 to impose tax reform and waived their right to review the decrees in an attempt to eschew political responsibility.<sup>52</sup> These examples raise an interesting puzzle. If there is widespread agreement about how the president will use decree powers (a plausible assumption), and if legislators believe that such decrees will hurt constituents who matter to them, then why do legislators believe that these constituents will not hold them accountable for knowingly delegating the power necessary to issue such decrees? Perhaps legislators are confident that voters, like most scholars to date, will take decrees as evidence of presidential usurpation and thus hold the president alone responsible, even when legislators have acquiesced in the decrees.<sup>53</sup>

### Interest Group Strategies

In trying to influence the policy process, do interest groups adopt consistently different strategies in parliamentary as opposed to presidential systems? The contributors to *Structure and Policy* find that they do because different political institutions encourage reelection-minded politicians to prioritize very different sets of interests. For example, legislators in Japan's former electoral system of single nontransferable votes privileged particularistic demands from constituents more than would be likely in a system of closed party lists. With respect to the U.S. presidential system, Cowhey and McCubbins argue that "shared law-making authority broadens the nature of the coalition necessary to change policy," which potentially creates opportunities for a wider array of interests.<sup>54</sup> Many of the chapter authors in *Do Institutions Matter?* are much less willing to attribute interest group access to "prior" institutional variables. For instance, Schick closes his analysis of budget policy by arguing that, even without considering institutional differences, deep-seated

patterns of interest group organization alone can explain much of the variation in deficit reduction that he documents. Thus, interest group pluralism in the U.S. and fragmented corporatism in the Netherlands prevented effective budget cutting, while strong and stable ties between the labor movement and the Social Democrats in Sweden facilitated effective fiscal policymaking.<sup>55</sup>

Apart from these differences, there is broad agreement that the separation of powers creates two foci for pressure group activities in presidential systems: the executive branch and the legislative branch.<sup>56</sup> Vogel argues in his study of environmental policy that the separation of powers lowers the cost of access for interest groups since "it is not necessary to command the support of a significant number of voters in order to affect the decisions of a congressional committee."<sup>57</sup> He finds that this argument holds for all sorts of diffuse interests in the U.S., including the women's movement, civil rights, and consumer organizations. Vogel also argues that, once diffuse interests get favorable policies adopted in presidential systems, multiple veto points lock in these policies. A case in point is the difficulty President Reagan encountered in attempting to reverse environmental regulation in the 1980s.<sup>58</sup> In contrast, in single-party-dominant parliamentary systems like Japan, environmental groups enjoyed little access to decision making since they were not electorally important to the LDP and Japan has no independently elected president who might have been more responsive to their concerns.

However, if the costs of interest group access are low in the U.S., how much is due to the separation of powers and how much to the particularly decentralized nature of power in the U.S. Congress after the reforms of the 1970s? In most other presidential systems legislative committees are less institutionalized, and policymaking authority tends to be held more tightly by party leaders rather than dispersed among backbenchers. Where there are few incentives for committee members to develop policy expertise, delegation to the executive becomes relatively more attractive as a means of taking advantage of bureaucratic expertise in the design of policies. Notwithstanding Carey and Shugart's argument that delegation may enhance the interests of congressional majorities, when legislators delegate to presidents the authority to write the specifics of policy, they are sending clear signals to interest groups about where to focus their lobbying efforts.

Since *Do Institutions Matter?* and *Structure and Policy* view presidentialism through the lens of the U.S., they tend to agree that interest groups have greater lobbying options in presidential as opposed to parliamentary systems. They disagree sharply, however, about where interest groups focus their pressure activities in parliamentary systems. Rockman and Weaver argue that in parliamentary systems "the bureaucracy and the cabinet ministers are the main points of access open to interest groups."<sup>59</sup> For example, in explaining the efficacy of Japanese industrial policy, Krauss and Pierre emphasize the relationship between the Ministry of International Trade and Investment and large industries organized into trade and peak associa-



tions.<sup>60</sup> In contrast, the contributors to *Structure and Policy* challenge the traditional view that centers responsibility for Japanese policymaking in the bureaucracy. Instead, for these authors party leaders are the individuals most responsible for processing the various demands of interest groups, despite the appearance of bureaucratic dominance. Consistently, the interests that matter most to the LDP, including large manufacturers, finance, and agriculture, are favored in the policy process relative to less important interests like consumers and environmentalists.

### Delegation to Bureaucrats

Politicians in parliamentary and presidential systems alike must rely on bureaucrats to implement the policies they adopt. There are reasons, however, to expect that legislators in presidential systems will be much more wary about delegating discretion to bureaucrats for fear that the president as a separately elected politician will use the bureaucracy in ways that do not advance legislators' interests. According to Cowhey and McCubbins, once the legislature has delegated powers to the president, "any attempts by Congress to overturn executive actions legislatively require the acquiescence of the executive himself (or an extraordinary majority, as defined in the Constitution)."<sup>61</sup> In parliamentary systems legislators retain ultimate authority over the cabinet and over bureaucrats in the event that delegated powers actually undermine the majority in the legislature.

In support of this distinction, several policy studies find that the legislature in the U.S. presidential system attempts to reduce its exposure to unresponsive bureaucrats by writing very detailed legislation and by favoring a high degree of procedural complexity. An example of detailed lawmaking in the U.S. is provided in the energy policy study by Feigenbaum, Samuels, and Weaver. They find that "legislators attempted to micromanage policy problems rather than give discretion to the executive."<sup>62</sup> Such detailed lawmaking has been particularly acute when different parties controlled the two branches, but it also occurs under unified government such as the period in the 1970s when Congress and President Carter clashed over the development of nuclear power. With respect to procedural complexity, Vogel's 1986 study of environmental regulation contrasts the use of uniform emissions standards and elaborate environmental impact statements in the U.S. with the high flexibility and greater case-by-case discretion of bureaucrats in Britain.<sup>63</sup> Noll and Rosenbluth find similar regulatory differences between the U.S. and Japan. "U.S. legislators, knowing that they are more likely to have policy conflicts...with the independent executive, are more likely to rely on formalized decision-making processes and judicial review to police the decisions of agencies than are legislators in Japan."<sup>64</sup> Moe and Caldwell take the argument further by writing that legislators in presidential systems systematically produce "bureaucratic monstrosities" because of their preference for complexity.<sup>65</sup>

As is the case with other attributes of the policymaking process, however, the propensity to delegate authority to bureaucrats may not be uniform across the different types of presidential and parliamentary systems. Despite the various ways they design delegation to safeguard against the possibility of usurpation by the president, legislators in most of the presidential systems studied in *Executive Decree Authority* do not seem to share with U.S. legislators such a pronounced preference for detailed lawmaking. The scope for bureaucratic discretion is consequently much broader. Crisp's study of delegation in the Venezuelan democracy is a powerful corrective to the notion that legislators in presidential systems use detailed legislation to rein in the president and the bureaucracy. Crisp shows instead that strong party discipline encouraged legislators from the ruling *Acción Democrática* party to delegate broad authority to President Andrés Pérez in the 1970s. The president used this authority to erect new bureaucratic structures in the form of credit institutions through which he channeled Venezuela's oil export revenues.<sup>66</sup> Members of the ruling party certainly benefited from this bureaucratic largesse, but they did not need detailed lawmaking and oversight committees to do so. In this case, party discipline appears to be as important as the separation of powers in shaping the propensity to delegate authority over the bureaucracy.

### Conclusion

For each attribute of the policy process analyzed above, various policy studies from the books under review support the case for systematic differences between governmental types. These differences are generally called into question, however, when variation within each governmental type is considered. Consequently, in most cases fundamental distinctions between parliamentarism and presidentialism tend to wash out. For example, the separation of powers may create more potential for veto players to obstruct policy change than is common in parliamentary systems. However, the use of multiparty coalitions in parliamentary systems serves to internalize veto points in the cabinet, and executive decrees in practice undermine the performance of legislators as veto players in many presidential systems. In applying the veto player concept, then, it is important not just to determine whether powers are divided but to specify exactly how they are divided. While the separation of powers makes policymaking highly transparent in presidential systems like the U.S., executive decree authority undercuts this feature in others. Though legislators in presidential systems are freer to focus on particularism than their counterparts in parliamentary systems, the direct election of the president in a single, nationwide district ensures a policymaking role for an actor with few particularistic incentives. Shared legislative authority makes it difficult for voters to identify which branch they should hold responsible for policy, but vetoes and roll call votes in some presidential systems

help voters hold individual politicians accountable. While certain types of parliamentary systems better concentrate responsibility for policy within the cabinet, this type of individual accountability is rare in parliamentarism. The separation of powers gives interest groups two separately elected branches on which to focus pressure, but the degree to which the legislature is organized to respond to these groups varies widely among different presidential systems. Finally, in some presidential systems politicians are loathe to delegate discretion to bureaucrats and instead legislate detailed laws, while in others they show no real interest in detailed lawmaking.

If the policy process can not be said to differ in regular and systematic ways between parliamentary and presidential government, what are the main implications of this finding? First, it suggests that, while policy analysts should take stock of the institutional incentives embedded in fused or separate powers, they will want to focus their efforts on lower-level institutional arrangements. This suggestion is important because in many countries outside the U.S. and Europe the workings of lower-level institutional variables such as electoral rules, bicameralism, and federalism are understudied and poorly understood. In many of these countries basic research on the organization of legislatures is needed before theorizing can proceed about the relationship between institutions and policy outcomes. To their credit, each of the three books under review incorporates additional institutional variables into their analyses, making them models for future policy studies. In the wake of democratization's third wave, one challenge facing research into the policy consequences of lower-level variables like electoral rules and intergovernmental relations is the frequency of change in these variables. In contrast to the general failure of efforts by reformers to switch between parliamentary and presidential forms of government, many democracies have embraced electoral reform and devolution, and these changes present policy analysts with certain problems and opportunities.

Second, the finding reveals the extent to which many of the features of the U.S. presidential system have been taken as emblematic of presidentialism as a governmental type. With its emphasis on delegation, decrees, and electoral rules, *Executive Decree Authority* forces us to rethink many of the accepted arguments about how presidentialism works. The book is an excellent example of the contribution that area case studies can make to general political science theories and speaks to the gains that can be achieved from better integrating the study of American and comparative politics.

Third, the finding that few systematic differences hold up in light of the diversity within each governmental type suggests that there is room for noninstitutionalist explanations of policy variation. In replaying the broader debate over institutions, the books under review make it clear that where one stands on this issue depends on assumptions about the priority of institutions relative to other variables that could explain policy outcomes. *Structure and Policy* assumes that institutions are prior and thus comes to much stronger conclusions about the causal roles played by institu-

tions such as the separation or fusion of powers. In contrast, the editors of *Do Institutions Matter?* are unwilling to assume "that the risks and opportunities associated with a particular set of institutions will be the same regardless of different societal conditions."<sup>67</sup> While its contributors often argue that policymakers in parliamentary regimes face different institutional incentives than their colleagues in presidential systems, they also believe that policymakers face another set of constraints that can not be ascribed to prior institutional sources.

By focusing on many countries that are in the process of consolidating democratic government, *Executive Decree Authority* raises critical questions about the role of institutions in uninstitutionalized settings where powerful individual politicians often flout the formal rules and these rules therefore can not be said to constrain them. Some of the case studies in this book successfully apply insights from contract theory to explain why legislators choose to delegate decree authority to the president. Others show that in some countries and in certain policy areas presidents have abused delegated decree authority in ways that undermine the interests of legislative majorities and throw into doubt the applicability of the new institutional economics in these settings. Happily, *Executive Decree Authority* is balanced in reporting both types of scenarios, enabling readers to come to their own conclusions regarding the persuasiveness of institutional explanations of policy outcomes in these countries.

Despite their different approaches to institutions and their different conclusions about how institutions shape the policy process, these three books share an important and unusual trait. Each combines high quality, detailed, and original research on salient policy issues with insights about some of the discipline's most pressing theoretical questions. Thus, despite the policy detail the reader never loses site of the bigger questions about policy and institutions that these books set out to tackle. Students of politics will therefore find these books valuable whether they are interested primarily in the theory or the empirics. Due to this successful and difficult balance, these three books should be emulated in future policy research.

## NOTES

1. For the argument linking presidential government with the failure to consolidate democracy, see Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarism versus Presidentialism," *World Politics*, 46 (1993). For analyses that question whether presidential systems have been especially prone to breakdown, see Donald Horowitz, "Comparing Democratic Systems," *Journal of Democracy*, 1 (1990); Timothy Power and Mark Gasiorowski, "Institutional Design and Democratic Consolidation in the Third World," *Comparative Political Studies*, 30 (1997).
2. Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).
3. Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira, Jose Maria Maravall, and Adam Przeworski, *Economic Reforms in*

*New Democracies* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

4. Advocates of parliamentary government in at least three countries (Brazil, South Korea, and the Philippines) have cited the Linzian critique of presidentialism.
5. See Fiona McGillivray, "Party Discipline as a Determinant of the Endogenous Formation of Tariffs," *American Journal of Political Science*, 41 (1997); Mark Ramseyer and Frances Rosenbluth, *Japan's Political Marketplace* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993); and Charles Stewart, "The Politics of Tax Reform in the 1980s," in Alberto Alesina and Geoffrey Carliner, eds., *Politics and Economics in the Eighties* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
6. Juan J. Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?," in Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., *The Failure of Presidential Democracy*, vol. 2 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press), p. 5.
7. Terry Moe and Michael Caldwell, "The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Government: A Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems," *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, 150 (1994), 172.
8. Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
9. Mark P. Jones, *Electoral Laws and the Survival of Presidential Democracy* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995).
10. Scott Mainwaring, "Presidentialism, Multipartyism, and Democracy: The Difficult Combination," *Comparative Political Studies*, 26 (1993). Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart, *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), present additional support for the importance of lower-level institutional variation (for example, the electoral and party system and the distribution of constitutional powers between the branches) in accounting for the performance of individual presidential systems.
11. George Tsebelis, "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism, Multipartyism," *British Journal of Political Science*, 25 (1995).
12. *Ibid.*, p. 290.
13. Exceptions to this general finding can be found in the chapters by Milner, Pierson, and Weaver and Krauss and Pierre in Bert A. Rockman and R. Kent Weaver, eds., *Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 1993). For example, Milner argues that, despite institutional variation among France, the U.K., and the U.S. along the parliamentary-presidential distinction, trade policy in each country reveals similar patterns due to common external problems, internal group pressures, and international institutions like GATT.
14. It also includes case studies of French premier-presidentialism, Italian multiparty parliamentarism, and the U.S.
15. Tsebelis, p. 293.
16. Moe and Caldwell, p. 177.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 311.
18. Two cases in point are Brazil (1992) and Venezuela (1993).
19. Moe and Caldwell, p. 178.
20. Linda Cohen, Matthew D. McCubbins, and Frances M. Rosenbluth, "The Politics of Nuclear Power in Japan and the United States," in Peter F. Cowhey and Matthew D. McCubbins, eds., *Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 183, 184.
21. Roger G. Noll and Frances M. Rosenbluth, "Telecommunications Policy: Structure, Process, Outcomes," in Cowhey and McCubbins, eds., p. 136.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 147.
23. Haruhiko Fukui and M. Stephen Weatherford, "Coordinating Economic Policies: A Schematic Model and Some Remarks on Japanese-U.S. Exchange Rate Policies," in Cowhey and McCubbins, eds., p. 227.
24. Allen Schick, "Governments versus Budget Deficits," in Rockman and Weaver, eds.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 230.
26. John M. Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart, "Calling Out the Tanks or Filling Out the Forms," in John M. Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart, eds., *Executive Decree Authority* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 9.
27. Timothy Power, "The Pen Is Mightier than the Congress: Presidential Decree Power in Brazil," in Carey and Shugart, eds., p. 224.
28. Delia Ferreira Rubio and Matteo Goretti, "When the President Governs Alone: The *Decretazo* in Argentina, 1989-1993," in Carey and Shugart, eds.
29. Tsebelis, p. 292.
30. Peter F. Cowhey, "The Politics of Foreign Policy in Japan and the United States," in Cowhey and McCubbins, p. 210.
31. Noll and Rosenbluth, p. 145.
32. Harvey Feigenbaum, Richard Samuels, and R. Kent Weaver, "Innovation, Coordination, and Implementation in Energy Policy," in Rockman and Weaver, eds., p. 93.
33. Paul Pierson and R. Kent Weaver, "Imposing Losses in Pension Policy," in Rockman and Weaver, eds., p. 138.
34. Cowhey, p. 208.
35. Matthew D. McCubbins and Gregory Noble, "The Appearance of Power: Legislators, Bureaucrats, and the Budget Process in the United States and Japan," in Cowhey and McCubbins, eds., p. 66.
36. Mark P. Jones, "Political Institutions and Public Policy," in Stephan Haggard and Matthew McCubbins, eds., *Political Structure and Economic Policy* (unpublished manuscript, University of California, San Diego, 1997).
37. Ferreira and Goretti, p. 53.
38. Brian F. Crisp, "Presidential Decree Authority in Venezuela," in Carey and Shugart, eds., pp. 76, 77.
39. Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy," p. 63. Other scholars suggest that this interest in particularism depends on electoral rules. See Barry Ames, "Electoral Rules, Constituency Pressures, and Pork Barrel: Bases of Voting in the Brazilian Congress," *Journal of Politics*, 57 (1995).
40. Rockman and Weaver, "Assessing the Effects of Institutions," p. 19.
41. Moe and Caldwell, p. 175.
42. Cowhey, pp. 205, 207.
43. Linz, "Parliamentary or Presidential Democracy," p. 13.
44. Shugart and Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies*, p. 44.
45. Schick, p. 229.
46. David Vogel, "Representing Diffuse Interests in Environmental Policymaking," in Rockman and Weaver, eds., p. 268.
47. Pierson and Weaver, "Imposing Losses," p. 112.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 143.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 144. Of course, roll call votes are not unique to presidentialism. Vincent Della Sala and Amie Kreppeel, "Dancing without a Lead: Legislative Decrees in Italy," in Carey and Shugart, eds., show that the incorporation of roll call votes has bolstered party discipline in Italy.
50. Gary Cox, *The Efficient Secrer* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
51. Scott Parrish, "Presidential Decree Authority in Russia: 1991-1995," in Carey and Shugart, eds., p. 72.
52. Gregory Schmidt, "Presidential Usurpation or Congressional Preference? The Evolution of Executive Decree Authority in Peru," in Carey and Shugart, eds., p. 123.
53. Still, this explanation assumes a level of hostility on the part of voters toward economic reforms that is disputed by research suggesting that voters in practice often reward politicians who can put suc-

cessful adjustment programs in place. See, for example, Karen Remmer, "The Political Economy of Elections in Latin America, 1980-1991," *American Political Science Review*, 87 (1993).

54. Peter Cowhey and Matthew McCubbins, "Introduction," in Cowey and McCubbins, eds., p. 6.
55. Schick, p. 235.
56. Moe and Caldwell, pp. 175, 176, disagree. For them, since the president is "highly autonomous" and impervious to group pressures, groups focus their lobbying activities on the legislature alone.
57. Vogel, p. 266.
58. *Ibid.*, pp. 267, 268.
59. Rockman and Weaver, "Assessing the Effects of Institutions," p. 28.
60. Ellis S. Krauss and Jon Pierre, "Targeting Resources for Industrial Change," in Rockman and Weaver, eds., p. 173.
61. Cowhey and McCubbins, "Introduction," p. 6.
62. Feigenbaum, Samuels, and Weaver, p. 63.
63. David Vogel, *National Styles of Regulation* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986).
64. Noll and Rosenbluth, p. 128.
65. Moe and Caldwell, p. 175.
66. Crisp, p. 147.
67. Rockman and Weaver, "When and How Do Institutions Matter?," p. 451.

## Abstracts

### **Kathryn Firmin-Sellers, Institutions, Context, and Outcomes: Explaining French and British Rule in West Africa**

Why did the development programs of Ghana and Ivory Coast, two nations with seemingly similar economies, diverge after independence? Crucial differences in the design of British and French colonial institutions illuminate the divergent policy choices. Institutional variations generated differences in property rights and land-holding, which formed the basis for different patterns of class formation. The link between institutions and outcomes is complex. Institutions' impact is contingent upon the interaction between overlapping institutional arrangements, institutions' direct impact upon targeted (usually state) actors, and institutions' indirect impact on others in society.

### **Xiaobo Lu, Booty Socialism, Bureau-preneurs, and the State in Transition: Organizational Corruption in China**

Most studies address corruption at the individual level. However, corruption can also take place at the institutional level. This article examines the concept, patterns, causes, and impact of organizational corruption in contemporary China. Also important is the changing nature of the state's role in China's transition from socialism. This role has not been entirely developmental, as many believe. It has also contributed to the increasingly widespread predatory behavior of public agencies.

### **Elise Giuliano, Who Determines the Self in the Politics of Self-Determination? Identity and Preference Formation in Tatarstan's Nationalist Mobilization**

Existing theories of ethnic mobilization that rely on essentialist assumptions about voters' political preferences should be reconceptualized. Contrary to theories that assume that ethnic group members have fixed, uniform preferences in support of nationalist political programs, voters' preferences in Tatarstan, Russia, from 1988 to 1994 were constructed through the dynamic interaction between voters and politicians' framing of issues. Nationalist mobilization in Tatarstan was initially popular but ultimately unsuccessful. Both common preferences across ethnic groups and heterogeneous preferences within groups can exist as a result of sociocultural cleavages within ethnic groups and politicians' framing and manipulation of political issues.