IS THERE AN ECONOMIC BASIS FOR POST-COMMUNIST VOTING? EVIDENCE FROM ROMANIAN ELECTIONS, 1992–2000

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The results of the 2000 Romanian national elections were a clear triumph for the Party of Social Democracy in Romania (PDSR) and an equally clear defeat for the Democratic Convention of Romania (CDR). The CDR parliamentary and presidential victories in 1996 ushered in a period of optimism that necessary economic reforms would finally be enacted and that Romania would become a full-fledged European country. Unfortunately, this period of optimism proved brief as infighting ensued among the CDR member-parties and other coalition members. This period marked the highest level of government instability during Romania's post-communist transition (three prime ministers were named). As a consequence of the infighting and instability, economic reforms were only partially enacted, and the country fell further behind the Visegrad countries of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Indeed, by the time of the 2000 national elections, Romania's economic performance was even less than that of Bulgaria. Placed within an economic context, it is easy to understand why Romanian voters repudiated the government coalition and the CDR.

However while much has been written on the transition of the Romanian party system (Gallagher 1997; Roper 1998; Pop-Eleches 1999), much less has been written about the changing attitude of the Romanian electorate (Shafir 1996; Popescu 1997). Both the 2000 and the 1996 national elections demonstrated significant swings in Romanian voter choice. In 2000, the electorate clearly rejected parties of the center right in favor of the leftist PDSR and the extreme right Greater Romania Party (PRM). Why did the ruling CDR do so poorly in the 2000 national elections? How did the CDR constituency evolve between the 1992, 1996 and the 2000 national elections that can explain the CDR success in 1996 and its failure in 2000?

In order to examine voter support (or lack thereof) for the CDR, this article addresses the relationship between ecological (i.e., demographic) variables and CDR voting. Specifically, I explore the relationship between county-level demographic data and voting for the CDR in the 1992 and the 1996 parliamentary elections and the 2000 presidential elections. While there is a literature that utilizes ecological voting to analyze party cleavages in Hungary (Racz 1991), Poland (Heyns and Bialecki 1991) and Bulgaria (Pacek 1994), no statistical research has been conducted to confirm the relationship of important ecological variables (e.g., unemployment, education and occupation) with Romanian voting. Therefore, this analysis provides an opportunity to place Romanian ecological voting within the general East European literature. Rather than using statistical analysis, the Romanian literature has examined the ecological pattern of voting for the 1990 and 1992 parliamentary and presidential elections using survey data (Datculescu and Liepelt 1991; Campeanu 1991; Campeanu 1993). To date, there has been no statistical analysis to determine whether the CDR ecological voting pattern has changed. My findings show that there was a change in the demographic variables associated with voting for the CDR in the 1992, 1996 and the 2000 national elections. The first section of this article will trace the development of the CDR from 1991 through the 2000 national elections. The second section will examine the CDR voting pattern and the Romanian demographic data to determine the changing characteristics of the CDR constituency between 1992 and 2000.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CDR

Romania's founding election occurred in May 1990. In this election, the ruling National Salvation Front (FSN), a predecessor of the PDSR, received 66% of the parliamentary seats, and its presidential candidate, Ion Iliescu, received 85% of the vote. While this was a major defeat for the opposition parties, the results were not unexpected. The Romanian revolution was only six months old, and the FSN capitalized on its links with the revolution and the former communist party structures. While several interwar parties such as the National Peasant Party Christian Democratic (PNTCD) and the National Liberal Party (PNL) were re-founded within a month of the

events of December 1989, these parties were in no organizational
position to challenge the FSN. Later in preparation for the 1992 local
elections, opposition parties began their initial discussions concerning
the formation of an electoral coalition. By November 1991, several
opposition parties had joined together to form the CDR. Though
members of the coalition have changed since its inception in late
1991, there was a core group of parties in the CDR between 1992 and
1996: the PNTCD, the Liberal Party '93 (PL '93), the National
Liberal Party-Democratic Convention (PNL-CD) and the Romanian
Ecological Party (PER). Like in any coalition, some member parties
withdrew from the organization (e.g., the Civic Alliance Party and the
Social Democratic Party of Romania) and other parties joined (e.g.,
the PNL and the Party of Romanian Alternative). Although the Hun-
garian Democratic Union of Romania (UDMR) was a member of the
CDR, it ran on separate party lists in both the 1992 and the 1996 par-
liamentary elections.

By the March 1992 local elections, the popularity and unity of
the FSN was declining. As a consequence, the CDR was able to win
the mayoral contests in several important cities including Bucharest,
Timisoara, Constanta and Brasov. In fact, the CDR won almost 65%
of the mayoral contests in municipalities with a population over
200,000. Because of the success of the CDR in these local elections,
the coalition contested the September 1992 national elections. Several
polls conducted during the summer found that the CDR would win a
plurality of the votes for the parliamentary election and a significant
share of the presidential vote. For example, the last pre-election poll
published by the Institute for Marketing and Polling predicted that the
CDR would receive 29.5% of the parliamentary vote and that the
newly formed pro-Iliescu Democratic National Salvation Front
(FDSN)[1] would receive only 12.5%. This poll predicted that the CDR
presidential candidate, Emil Constantinescu, would receive 34% of
the vote while Iliescu would only receive 27%. However, the CDR
did not perform as well as expected in these elections. The CDR
received only 20% of the parliamentary vote, and Constantinescu lost
to Iliescu in the second round of voting. In 1992, the CDR emphasized
an overly ideological message that alienated some voters and eventu-
ally caused friction among member parties. The leading party in the
coalition, the PNTCD, was seen by many as a pro-monarchical and

vehemently anti-communist party that would coerce former communist party members.

Throughout 1993 and 1994, party divisions emerged within the coalition that ultimately led to its fragmentation by February 1995 (Roper 1998). Eventually the Civic Alliance Party and the Social Democratic Party of Romania left the CDR while the PNL rejoined the coalition. The first test of the newly reconstituted CDR occurred in the June 1996 local elections. Similar to 1992, CDR candidates won the mayoral contests in several major Romanian cities and approximately 19% of the city and county council seats. However, the question still remained whether the CDR could capitalize on its success in the upcoming November national elections.

Unlike the 1992 national elections, the CDR in 1996 emphasized a message that was inclusive and focused on economic reform. Its "Contract with Romania" addressed the problems that it pledged to solve 200 days after the election. Polls conducted by the Romanian Public Opinion Survey Institute (IRSOP) indicated that voters approved of the contract. Approximately 68% of respondents indicated that they had a "very good" or "good" opinion of the contract. By October, another IRSOP poll indicated a further reduction in PDSR support. This poll reported that the PDSR vote share in the parliamentary election declined from 31% in September to 24% while the CDR share had increased to over 30%.

Several pre-election polls in 1992 had also predicated an opposition victory; however unlike 1992, the CDR continued with its positive message based on economic reform rather than anti-communist rhetoric. In the November 1996 elections, the CDR received a plurality of votes for both houses (30%) and formed a coalition government with the Social Democratic Union (USD)[2] and the UDMR. The PDSR, which received approximately 22% of the vote, had lost about 6% of its constituency while the CDR had increased its share approximately 10%. What enabled the CDR to increase its share of the vote? Exit polls indicated that while the PDSR continued to be popular among the peasantry, adults over 65 and in rural areas, the CDR was successful with Romania's growing entrepreneurial class, and also many working class voters defected from the PDSR to the CDR.

Following the success of the CDR, there was a great deal of optimism that necessary economic reforms would finally be enacted

by the parliament, and certainly the pace of economic reform was faster under the government led by Victor Ciorbea than under the previous governments. However, during the 1996 national elections, there had been disagreements between the CDR and the USD concerning a pre-electoral arrangement concerning the distribution of portfolios. By the summer of 1997, there was open dissention in the coalition. The pretext for most of the conflict was the issue of economic reform, but in reality much of the conflict stemmed from a clash of personalities.

The Ciorbea government was under constant attack from within the coalition and from opposition parties. By March 1998, Radu Vasile replaced Ciorbea as prime minister; however, this change in the government did not eliminate the infighting among the coalition members. By December 1999, President Constantinescu nominated the Governor of the National Bank of Romania, Mugur Isarescu, as prime minister. Isarescu was a well-respected, non-political financial expert. It was hoped that his economic experience and links with Western financial institutions would help the floundering CDR coalition. However, the constant bickering among the coalition members and within parties, particular the PNTCD, continued in the Isarescu government.

By the time of the 2000 national elections, it was clear that the newly renamed CDR 2000 would enjoy far less support than in 1996. The CDR had been reduced to a coalition of just five parties (the PNTCD, the PER, the PNL-CD, the Romanian Ecologist Federation and the Union of Rightists Forces). In the parliamentary elections, the CDR 2000 received approximately 5.7% of the parliamentary vote.[3] Presidential candidate Isarescu received just under 10% of the vote. Exit polls indicated that the vote was essentially based on the poor economic record of the CDR. While the exit polls and survey research provide some evidence for the changing nature of the CDR constituency, a more thorough statistical analysis is necessary in order to understand Romanian voting.

ECOLOGICAL PATTERNS OF VOTING

Because we do not know how specific individuals vote, ecological voting uses aggregate or group data to study individual behavior.

Specifically, aggregate demographic variables are inferred to the individual-level in order to assess characteristics associated with voting. In other words, inferences are based on the relationship between the individual and the aggregate, and these ecological inferences have been used throughout social science. However, Robinson (1950) was the first to identify some of the problems associated with using aggregate data to study individual behavior. Robinson argues that the relationship between ecological and individual correlations are biased. He argues that you cannot make inferences about individual behavior from aggregate or group characteristics. While Shively (1969) argues that ecological correlations can present serious inference problems, he notes several techniques that eliminate aggregate-level bias.

King (1997) also presents an alternative solution to addressing the aggregation bias involved in ecological correlations. He argues that while ecological analysis can lead to estimator and aggregation bias, he also notes that this form of analysis presents some clear advantages over survey research. For example while exit polls and pre-election surveys provide a general description of the CDR constituency, ecological voting patterns can provide a more complete picture of the relationship between demographic variables and voting. As King notes even "if the address of each survey respondent were available, the usual 1,000-2,000 respondents to national surveys are insufficient for learning much about spatial variation" (1997, 5). Therefore, an analysis of ecological voting supplements the already existing Romanian survey literature.

In order to analyze the pattern of CDR voting during the 1992 and 1996 parliamentary and 2000 presidential elections, I analyzed the CDR voting returns for the Chamber of Deputies (the lower house) and the demographic characteristics of the forty Romanian counties (*judete*) and the capital of Bucharest.[4] The election returns utilized in this study come from the 1992 and the 1996 *Monitorul oficial al Romaniei* and the 2000 data is from the Central Election Commission's home page. The county-level data is drawn from the 1993 *Anuarul statistic al Romaniei*. Unlike the United States, the forty Romanian counties are administrative units that are also used as electoral districts. This type of unit is most preferred in ecological analysis. King notes that "ecological inferences based on...counties or

other Census Bureau categories may therefore be somewhat more reliable" (1997, 51). While noting some of the problems with eco-logical analysis, Heyns and Bialecki in their study of Polish voting behavior argue that this method is advantageous when the "units of analysis are inherently meaningful" (1991, 358). Aggregation bias decreases if the units of analysis are not created for partisan reasons. Therefore, using Romanian county-level data provides less bias in the inferences to individual behavior.

For each county, I calculated the percentage of the county electorate that voted for the CDR (in the lower house) in 1992 and 1996. Because the CDR did not pass the electoral threshold in the 2000 parliamentary elections, I cannot find the specific electoral per-centage by county. Therefore, I have used the first round presidential vote in 2000 as a substitute measure. The comparative political science literature recognizes that certain demographic variables are associated with voting. For example, variables such as education (Powell 1986), income and unemployment (Lewis-Beck 1988) and region (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980) are found to correlate with American voting behavior. Recent studies by Powers and Cox (1997) and Pacek (1994) found that socioeconomic variables (particularly income and unemployment) were also correlated with voting in East European countries.

Romanian surveys have also found that these ecological variables are associated with CDR voting. Specifically, surveys conducted in 1992 and 1996 provide some evidence for the Romanian ecological pattern of voting. IRSOP surveys for the 1992 and the 1996 parlia-mentary elections found that there was an urban/rural cleavage associated with CDR voting. While the CDR polled well in urban areas, it had much less support in the rural regions. These results, which were consistent between these two elections, are not surprising given the lack of media access and a more traditional lifestyle in the rural regions. IRSOP surveys also found that the CDR received more support among intellectuals and those with a higher education degree. Those with only a general school education (the equivalent to Ameri-can junior high school) were much less likely to vote for the CDR.

Based on the political science and Romanian literature, I examined the relationship between seven key ecological variables with CDR voting in 1992, 1996 and 2000. I used ecological regression

with weighted least squares to assess the relationship between CDR voting and these ecological variables. The following model specifies the hypothesized relationship:

$$CDR\ (Y) = \beta_0 + \beta_1\ RURAL + \beta_2\ ETHNIC + \beta_3\ UNEMPLOY + \beta_4\ EDUCATE + \beta_5\ AGRICULTURE + \beta_6\ INDUSTRY + \beta_7\ HUNGARIAN + \beta_8\ POPULATION,$$

where:
AGRICULTURE = Percentage of county population employed
        in agriculture;
CDR = Percentage of CDR county vote for parliament 1992 and
        1996 and presidential vote 2000;
EDUCATE = Percentage of county population with a higher
        education degree;
ETHNIC = Percentage of ethnic Romanians in the county;
HUNGARIAN = Percentage of ethnic Hungarians in the county;
INDUSTRY = Percentage of county population employed in
        industrial enterprises;
POPULATION = County population;
RURAL = Percentage of county population living in rural area;
UNEMPLOY = Percentage of reported county unemployment.

All of these statistics were available in the *Anuarul statistic al României*; although for several variables, I had to construct the percentages based on the total numbers reported. Achen and Shively (1995) argue that population weighting should be used when district sizes are highly variable. Therefore, I included a variable for population in order to account for the variance in the Romanian counties (for example, the county population range was 233,256 to 2,254,510). I decided to include two ethnic variables because including only a variable for ethnic Hungarians would not reflect the ethnic composition of some of the counties. Even including a variable for ethnic Hungarians is somewhat problematic because while the UDMR ran on separate party lists, it was a member of the CDR. Certainly in both rounds of the 1992 presidential election and in the 1996 presidential run-off election between Iliescu and Constantinescu, the UDMR constituency supported the CDR candidate (an important difference in the 2000 elections).

Results for the 1992 Parliamentary Elections

Table 1 reports the results for the model. As discussed earlier, pre-election surveys and exit polls from the 1992 parliamentary elections indicated that CDR support would come primarily from voters that were highly educated and urbane. However, the results reported in Table 1 provide evidence that the CDR constituency was more diverse. While the correlations for certain variables confirm some of these survey findings (e.g., a negative correlation between CDR voting and the percentage of the rural county population and a positive correlation between education level and CDR voting), other variables had signs which would not have been predicted by the literature (e.g., a positive correlation between CDR voting and employment in agriculture). The 1992 exit polls indicated that there was strong labor support for the FDSN, particularly from workers engaged in heavy industrial and agricultural enterprises, but Table 1 shows a positive and statistically significant relationship between CDR voting and agricultural employment. This means that the CDR drew support from workers in this sector. Perhaps because this variable is an aggregate estimate of county employment, it might be necessary in the future to disaggregate employment in this sector. CDR support most likely came from workers employed in *private* agricultural enterprises rather than state-owned enterprises.[5]

**Table 1: Aggregate Outcomes Regressed on County
Characteristics for the 1992 Parliamentary Elections**

Independent Variables	Dependent Variable CDR Voting (%)
Employment in agriculture (%)	.1312*
Higher education degree(%)	.6277***
Ethnic Romanian(%)	.2848**
Ethnic Hungarian(%)	-.3564***
Employment in industry(%)	.1148
Population in rural area(%)	-.6184
County-level unemployment(%)	.0731
Adjusted R^2	.62

Note: One-tailed tests have been used
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01

Table 1 also indicates that the rural population, unemployment rate and employment in industry variables were not statistically significant. I expected that the voters from counties in which unemployment was the highest would have voted for the opposition at that time in order to punish the incumbent party (FDSN). This, of course, assumes that Romanians vote retrospectively. In retrospective voting, voters are more concerned with results than policy positions. These policy positions tend to be more ideologically based (Fiorina 1981). In prospective voting, voters are more concerned with the policies (ideology) and not as much on the results. Perhaps, Romanians vote prospectively and therefore, the government was not punished for the lack of economic reform and progress. Voters were not as concerned about the results of economic policies as the ideological basis of the policies (i.e., a socialist versus a market approach). If this is true, then it is easier to understand why the CDR message that attacked the ideological basis of the FDSN was not successful with voters.

As Table 1 indicates there was a positive and statistically significant relationship between education and CDR voting. Of all the variables, education was the most correlated with opposition voting. This confirms the pre-election surveys and exit polls that showed that the CDR constituency was more educated than that of the FDSN or the several extremist parties. Interestingly, the other two variables that were found to be significant included the two ethnic variables. The county percentage of ethnic Hungarians was negatively correlated with opposition voting. As previously noted, this finding is really an artifact of the election protocol signed between the UDMR and the CDR that recognized separate UDMR lists. If the UDMR had run candidates on the CDR lists, this variable would have been positively related to CDR voting.

The county percentage of ethnic Romanians was positively correlated with opposition voting. The CDR had stronger support from ethnic Romanians than from non-ethnic Romanians. Again, this could be an artifact of the separation of the UDMR from CDR voting. However while ethnic Hungarians are overwhelmingly the largest single ethnic minority in Romania, there are other ethnic minorities that this variable takes into account. Therefore, it could be that even if the UDMR were included in the dependent variable, the ethnic Romanian variable would still be significant.

Overall, the model accounts for 62% of the CDR vote. While certain county-level variables were statistically significant (e.g., education, agriculture, ethnic Romanian and ethnic Hungarian), some variables such as agriculture were correlated with CDR voting in an unexpected direction. While the 1992 data yields some surprising results, how do these county-level findings compare to the 1996 data? Are these same variables associated with CDR voting in the 1996 parliamentary elections or do the 1996 results confirm that the basis for CDR voting changed between the elections?

RESULTS FOR THE 1996 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

Because the results of the 1996 parliamentary and presidential elections were substantially different than in 1992, I expected that the analysis of the 1996 data should yield different findings. Table 2 reports the results for the 1996 data and shows several important differences. For the 1996 data, the model's adjusted R^2 value not only increased (from 62% to 67%), but the number of significant variables declined from four to three. This means that for the 1996 parliamentary election, the model has greater explanatory ability with fewer variables.

In terms of the variables, county-level unemployment is positively correlated with CDR voting in 1996. Unlike 1992, voters from counties with higher employment were more likely to vote for the opposition. This indicates that economic issues were more salient to the CDR constituency and that this constituency was now engaged in retrospective voting. Unlike 1992, CDR voters were finally punishing the ruling PDSR for the lack of economic progress. This finding accords with the exit polls conducted by IRSOP which showed that the CDR did particularly well with white collar and even manual workers (*Evenimentul zilei* 1996). As the level of unemployment and economic frustration increased, the CDR was able to attract voters from the PDSR constituency. This finding not only supports the notion of retrospective voting, it also supports the prior research on macroeconomic conditions and East European voting. Pacek found that economic adversity had an effect on party choice and was correlated with "punishment for incumbents held responsible for economic reform" (1994, 723).

**Table 2: Aggregate Outcomes Regressed on County
Characteristics for the 1996 Parliamentary Elections**

	Dependent Variable
Independent Variables	CDR Voting (%)
Employment in agriculture (%)	-.1814
Higher education degree(%)	.6925***
Ethnic Romanian(%)	.4887
Ethnic Hungarian(%)	-.5258**
Employment in industry(%)	.3000
Population in rural area(%)	-.5833
County-level unemployment(%)	.1227*
Adjusted R^2	.67

Note: One-tailed tests have been used
*$p < .10$, **$p < .05$, ***$p < .01$

　　　Education and the ethnic Hungarian variable were once again
related to CDR voting. Interestingly in a stepwise analysis, the ethnic
Hungarian variable's partial R^2 contributed much more to the model's
R^2 in 1996 than in 1992 (18.8% compared to 4.4%). In other words,
the ethnic Hungarian variable was even more important in explaining
the CDR voting pattern in 1996. While the UDMR ran on a separate
party list in 1992, it did not field its on presidential candidate. Perhaps
the reason why this variable was more salient was because in 1996,
the UDMR ran its own presidential candidate (Gyorgy Frunda). How-
ever in the 1996 run-off between Constantinescu and Iliescu, UDMR
voters were crucial to the success of the CDR candidate (Shafir 1996,
15). Similar to the 1992 analysis, this variable would have been posi-
tively associated with CDR voting if the UDMR had not run on sepa-
rate lists. In the 1996 analysis, the agriculture variable was not only
insignificant but also negatively associated with CDR voting. Unlike
1992, those employed in the agricultural sector were more likely to
vote against the opposition. This finding accords with the earlier sur-
veys that indicated that CDR voters were mostly workers in urban
areas.

Results for the 2000 Presidential
Parliamentary Elections

The analysis of the 2000 CDR presidential vote yields some stark differences with the 1992 and 1996 elections. Unlike the 1992 and 1996 elections, the model's explanatory ability decreased sharply. The adjusted R^2 declined to less than 15%. Moreover, only the ethnic Hungarian variable was found to be statistically significant and associated with the CDR presidential vote. Like 1992 and 1996, the Hungarian vote was negatively correlated with the CDR vote. However unlike 1996, economic variables that had been associated with CDR success were no longer significant. Surprisingly higher education, a variable always associated with CDR voting, was actually negatively related to the CDR vote in 2000. A significant percentage of the traditional voter base of the CDR had defected in 2000. This finding supports the pre-electoral polls that indicated that Romanian voters were dissatisfied with the CDR economic program. In essence, the 1996 CDR constituency fragmented over economic reform, and the coalition found little support among its traditional electorate.

**Table 3: Aggregate Outcomes Regressed on County
Characteristics for the 2000 Presidential Elections**

Independent Variables	Dependent Variable CDR Voting (%)
Employment in agriculture (%)	-.536
Higher education degree(%)	-.546
Ethnic Romanian(%)	-.411
Ethnic Hungarian(%)	-.431***
Employment in industry(%)	-.204
Population in rural area(%)	-.646
County-level unemployment(%)	.143
Adjusted R^2	.14

Note: One-tailed tests have been used
*$p < .10$, **$p < .05$, ***$p < .01$

Therefore, economic variables that are so often thought to be associated with voting do not provide a clear measure of Romanian voter support. While Romanian voters engaged in retrospective voting

in 1996, these same voters rejected an economic basis of voting. Perhaps this finding is not surprising given that by 2000 none of the leading parties and candidates could be viewed as real economic reformers. Corneliu Vadim Tudor's amazing success in the presidential elections indicates that other issues (e.g., nationalism and corruption) were much more important in 2000.

This analysis of the ecological pattern of CDR voting in the 1992 and the 1996 parliamentary elections provides some insight as to why the CDR was successful in 1996 and why the coalition failed to pass the electoral threshold in 2000. As Table 1 illustrates, the CDR was not able to capitalize on economic issues in 1992. While the CDR was able to attract urban and educated voters, its economic message did not resonate. Shafir argues that during the 1992 national election, the CDR did not emphasize "matters of policy and program" and was considered "out of touch with the country's burning problems" (1992, 3-4). The CDR emphasized ideological issues rather than policy issues that alienated some of the electorate.

The 1996 "Contract with Romania" signaled a departure for the CDR. Instead of emphasizing ideological issues, the CDR emphasized an economic reform message that built on a new constituency of workers, entrepreneurs and the unemployed. The ecological pattern of voting in 1996 indicated that while education was still an important characteristic of the CDR constituency, the new CDR constituency was also based on an economic reform program. The failure of the CDR to implement economic reform is one of the major reasons why the coalition did so poorly in 2000. The CDR was not able to keep its 1996 constituency together because of the failure of economic reform and inability to raise the standard of living. Instead of focusing on economic reform, voters turned to other issues during the 2000 election. The CDR, which was such a fixture in Romanian politics, has been reduced to its core of the PNTCD. Whether the coalition will persist until 2004 is unclear. While some form of coalition might linger until then, it is doubtful that the CDR will ever enjoy the success of 1996.

Notes

1. Because of a conflict over personalities and economic reform, pro-Iliescu supporters left the FSN in March 1992 to form the FDSN. For a complete discussion of the splintering of the FSN see Roper (1999).

2. The USD was a coalition of the Democratic Party (PD) and the Social Democratic Party of Romania. The PD was one of the successor parties to the FSN and is led by former prime minister Petre Roman.

3. While the party threshold for the 2000 parliamentary elections was established at 5%, the threshold for coalitions was set at sliding scale whereby a coalition with over four parties, such as CDR 2000, required 10% of the vote for representation.

4. In this analysis, I did not treat the Ilfov Agricultural Sector as a separate county because the Romanian government does not provide demographic information for the Sector.

5. It is forgotten that there were many individuals employed in the private agricultural sector by 1992. So-called "spontaneous privatization" occurred in the agricultural sector almost immediately after the revolution. Farm workers dismantled the collective farm system and redistributed land, livestock and materials. By 1992, a majority of the collective farms had undergone this spontaneous privatization.

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